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Loyola Consumer Law Reporter
Finally, the Fourth Circuit held
that Miles had no duty to warn of
the risk of the transmission of the
AIDS virus in September of 1983.
Although pharmaceutical companies must warn consumers of the
reasonably foreseeable risks associated with their products, the court
concluded that they cannot be expected to warn of every possible
harm associated with those products. The evidence indicated that
when the Koyne was administered
to Mrs. Doe there was no medical
consensus that AIDS was transmissible by blood or blood products.
The closest thing Miles had to a
warning of the risk was a bulletin
issued by the National Hemophilia
Foundation in December, 1982
that described an "increased concern" with the "potential risk" of
blood or blood product transmission of AIDS. According to the
court, the knowledge of the risk at
that time was insufficient to require Miles to warn of the possibility of the transmission of AIDS
through Koyne. The court refused
to force pharmaceutical companies
to warn the public about every
possible risk associated with the
use of drugs, blood or blood products, as that would undermine the
effectiveness of the warnings regarding these products. Thus, the
Fourth Circuit held that Miles had
no duty to warn prospective users
about the risks associated with the
use of Koyne.
The Fourth Circuit's Disposition of

the Case
The Fourth Circuit affirmed the
district court's conclusion that
there were no issues of material
fact necessary to the resolution of
any of the Does' claims. According
to the court, Koyne was an unavoidably unsafe product, and
therefore it was not unreasonably
dangerous. Also, the court held
that Miles complied with the applicable standard of care both in its
duty to ensure the safety of Koyne
and in its duty to warn of the
product's inherent dangers. Therefore, the Fourth Circuit upheld the
summary judgment for the defendant, Miles Laboratories.
Stephen McKenna
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Eighth Circuit Holds
That Insurer's Duty to
Make Certain Coverage
Available Was Not
Breached by Failure to
Explain Such Coverage
In Edens v. Shelter Mutual Insurance Company, 923 F.2d 79 (8th
Cir. 1991), the court held that an
insurer made underinsured motorist coverage available to a policyholder when the insurer specifically mentioned, but did not explain
such coverage on renewal forms
and other correspondence with the
policyholder.
Background
Marcus Edens ("Edens") was
seriously injured when another vehicle struck the automobile in
which he was a passenger. At the
time of the accident, Edens was a
passenger in a car which belonged
to Irwin and Sandra Johnson ("the
Johnsons"). The Johnsons were
policyholders of Shelter Mutual
Insurance Co., Inc. ("Shelter Mutual").
The other driver's insurance
company paid Edens $25,000 in
settlement of his claim. This
amount failed to compensate him
fully for the extent of his injuries.
The Johnsons had not elected to
purchase underinsured motorist
coverage which might have entitled them to recover from their
own insurer any damages in excess
of the amount covered by the policy owned by the driver-at-fault.
Edens claimed he was entitled to
underinsured motorist coverage
under the Johnsons' policy, because Shelter Mutual did not
"make available" such coverage as
mandated in Ark. Code Ann. §
23-89-209 (Supp. 1989).
The Arkansas underinsured motorist statute provided that every
automobile liability insurer must
"make available" to its policyholders coverage protecting them
against underinsured motorists.
Edens argued that Shelter Mutual
violated the statute and that the
law should therefore impute such
coverage to the policyholders, and
thus allow him to recover under
the statute as a passenger.

Shelter Mutual asserted that it
had not deviated from the statutory requirement, and that even if it
had, there was no reason to impute
coverage. Additionally, Shelter
Mutual argued that even if coverage were imputed to the Johnsons,
Edens was beyond the sphere of
recovery since he was only a passenger in the vehicle.
Edens sued Shelter Mutual in
Arkansas state court. The suit was
removed on diversity grounds to
federal court by Shelter Mutual.
The District Court Proceedings
The United States District
Court for the Western District of
Arkansas held that Shelter Mutual's practice of offering underinsured motorist coverage to policyholders, by including an obvious
reference to it on their application
and renewal form, adequately
"made available" such coverage,
as required by the statute.
Edens contended that Shelter
Mutual had the obligation to take
affirmative, "commercially reasonable" steps to make available
its product, and that simply offering it without explanation put policyholders at a disadvantage. Shelter Mutual counterargued that it
met the "make available" standard
in the statute by providing a
"check-off" box for choosing underinsured motorist coverage,
placed three inches above the insured's signature block on the application as well as filing rates with
the state insurance commissioner.
The court found the insurer in
compliance with the statute and
granted summary judgment for the
insurer.
The Court of Appeals Affirms

Sitting in diversity to decide this
case of first impression under state
law, the Court of Appeals expressed its reluctance to expand
the meaning of the statute without
guidance from the state courts. In
making its decision, the court focused on the intent of the Arkansas
legislature, and on judicial interpretations from other jurisdictions
dealing with similar legislation.
The court gleaned the intent of
the Arkansas legislature from Arkansas statutes regulating other
(continued on page 144)
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types of insurance, namely uninsured motorist and "no-fault" coverage. The statutes governing these
coverages provided that they
would be included automatically in
a policy unless the insured specifically rejected them. Ark. Code
Ann. § 23-89-403 (Supp. 1984) and
Ark. Code Ann. § 23-89-202 (Supp.
1989). This language was much
stronger than that found in the
underinsured motorist statute,
which simply required that the
coverage be "made available."
This difference suggested to the
court that the state legislature considered uninsured motorist and
"no-fault" coverage more important than underinsured coverage,
and that Shelter Mutual's duty to
provide underinsured coverage
was simply to make it available to
its policyholders.
There were few decisions, from
any jurisdiction, which interpreted
the "make available" language.
Edens relied heavily on Jacobson v.
Illinois Farmers Insurance Company, 264 N.W.2d 804 (Minn.
1978) which approved of an insurer's actions as "commercially reasonable" when that insurer "made
available" coverage by offering an
application accompanied by information about the coverage to its
renewing policyholders.
Shelter Mutual did not offer
information to the Johnsons. Using the Jacobson analysis, Edens
argued that Shelter Mutual did not
"make available" the coverage.
Edens contended that consumers
in general, and the Johnsons in
particular, were too ignorant to
decide on the value of such coverage without more information. Rejecting this argument as one better
addressed to and by the Arkansas
legislature, the court stated its hesitancy to read a "commercial reasonableness test" into the statute
and refused to do so.
Summary Judgment Was Proper
The Court of Appeals affirmed
the summary judgment for Shelter
Mutual on the basis that the insurer complied with the Arkansas
underinsured motorist statute. The
court did not reach the question of
144

whether coverage would have been
imputed if Shelter Mutual had
violated the statute, nor did the
court consider whether Edens's
status as a passenger, rather than a
policyholder, would have affected
his ability to recover under imputed coverage. Finally, the court
noted that this was a close case and
that the waiver of oral argument by
both sides was unfortunate.
Frank J. Troppe

Granting Contested
Telephone Rate
Increases Without
Evidentiary Hearing
Violates Due Process
Recently, the Supreme Court of
Iowa ruled on the constitutionality
of allowing a utility rate increase
when opponents of the increase
were not given the opportunity for
an evidentiary hearing. In Office of
Consumer Advocate v. Iowa State
Commerce Commission, 465
N.W.2d 280 (Iowa 1991), the court
held that the Iowa Utilities Board
("Utilities Board") violated the
Office of Consumer Advocate's
("OCA") constitutional rights to
due process when the Utilities
Board determined that a proposed
telephone rate increase was reasonable without having allowed the
OCA opportunity to present evidence contesting the credibility of
material facts submitted in support
of the increase.
Background
In December 1985, United Telephone Company of Iowa ("United") filed a rate increase application with the Iowa State
Commerce Commission (now
known as the Iowa Utilities
Board). United sought to increase
its directory assistance charges
from $0.25 to $0.75 and to create
new operator service charges ranging from $0.75 to $2.75 effective as
of January 5, 1986. Pursuant to
Iowa Code § 476.6(7), the United
official responsible for rates and
tariffs attached to his application a
sworn affidavit stating that the
proposed increases were necessary
to offset increased expenses in-

curred by the company as a result
of a contractual change with
Northwestern Bell. In addition,
United provided a statement of
projected revenues and expenses
under the current and revised
agreements.
United notified its customers of
the proposed increases by letter
and invited them to file written
objections with the Utilities Board.
The Utilities Board received several objections. One of these was
from the OCA, asserting that the
increases were unreasonable and
unjust and asking the Utilities
Board to deny United's application
or, alternatively, to docket it for
further investigation. OCA stated
that United had failed to supply
sufficient evidence supporting the
reasonableness of the increases and
questioned United's claim that the
proposed changes were revenue
neutral. It charged that United had
understated its revenue projections and overstated its expenses.
United answered OCA by arguing that Iowa Code § 476.6(7) and
corresponding administrative regulations allowed rate making without evidentiary hearings when rate
changes affected only specific services and not basic or general rates.
Although United admitted that its
expense and revenue figures were
based on estimates, the company
argued that the increases were reasonable because it would suffer
revenue losses even with the proposed increases.
Despite OCA's concerns, and
without granting an evidentiary
hearing, the Utilities Board authorized the tariff, or rate increases.
When, however, the Utilities
Board received a subsequent proposal by United to increase rates
unrelated to those in its previous
request, the Utilities Board questioned whether the proposed tariffs
were piecemeal, general ratemaking requiring the submission of
additional factual evidence. The
Utilities Board then suspended
United's rate increases and asked
OCA and United to submit briefs
solely on the legal issues of whether
the increases were specific or general and whether the agency had
the authority to approve the increases without evidentiary hearing.
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